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Public Entities, Officers and Employees
Public Entities, Officers and Employees; California State Universitywhistleblowers
Government Code § 8547.12 (new).

SB 2097 (Hayden); 1994 STAT. Ch. 834
Under existing law, University of California (UC) employees' may file a

written complaint with their supervisor or manager, or with any other university

officer designated for that purpose,2 alleging actual or attempted acts of reprisal,
retaliation, threats, coercion, or similar improper acts against the employee having
disclosed improper governmental activities.3 Existing law also provides that any

person4 who intentionally engages in any act of reprisal, retaliation, threats,
coercion, or similar acts against a UC employee for having disclosed improper
governmental activities is subject to a fine and imprisonment.5

Chapter 834 enacts provisions for California State University employees
similar to those applicable to UC employees, but would require that the

1.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8547.10(a) (West Supp. 1994) (defining University of California
employees to include officers, faculty members, or applicants for employment).
2.
See id. (stating that this designation is made by the regents of the University of California).
3.
Id.; see id. § 8547.2(b) (West Supp. 1994) (defining improper governmental activity as any activity
by a state agency or by an employee that is undertaken in the performance of the employee's official duties,
whether that action is within the scope of his or her employment, and that: (1) is in violation of any state or
federal law or regulation, including but not limited to, corruption, malfeasance, bribery, theft of government
property, fraudulent claims, fraud, coercion, conversion, malicious prosecution, misuse of government
property, or willful omission to perform duty; or (2) is economically wasteful or involves gross misconduct,
incompetency, or inefficiency). For purposes of California Government Code §§ 8547.4, 8547.5, 8547.10, and
8547.11, improper governmental activity includes any activity by the University of California or by an
employee, including an officer or faculty member, that otherwise meets the criteria of Chapter 6.5
(commencing with § 8543) of the Government Code. Id. See also id. § 8547.1 (West Supp. 1994) (declaring

that it is the intent of the Legislature that state employees and other persons should disclose, to the extent not
expressly prohibited by law, improper governmental activities); id. § 8547.4 (West Supp. 1994) (mandating
that the State Auditor administer the provisions of this article and investigate and report on improper
governmental activities); id. § 8547.5 (West Supp. 1994) (allowing the State Auditor, upon receiving specific
information that any employee or state agency has engaged in an improper governmental activity, to conduct
an investigative audit of the matter). The identity of the person providing the information that initiated the
investigative audit will not be disclosed without his or her written permission unless the disclosure is to a law
enforcement agency that is conducting a criminal investigation. Id. See generally id. § 19683 (West Supp.
1994) (requiring a hearing or investigation of a written complaint of reprisal or retaliation).
4.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8547.2(c) (West Supp. 1994) (defining person as any individual,
corporation, trust, association, any state or local government, or any agency or instrumentality of any of the
foregoing).
5.
Id. § 8547.10(b) (West Supp. 1994); see id. (stating that the fine is not to exceed $10,000 and the
imprisonment in the county jail will not exceed one year); id. § 8547.10(c) (West Supp. 1994) (permitting a
court to award punitive damages, where the acts of the offending party are proven to be malicious, and
reasonable attorney fees). However, any action for damages will not be available to the injured party unless
the injured party first filed a complaint with the university officer identified pursuant to California Government
Code § 8547.10(a). Id.
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complaints6 be filed with an officer designated by the California State University
trustees.
INERPRETIVE COMMENT

Chapter 834 was introduced to provide an in-house grievance procedure as
well as legal remedies to California State University employees who have
disclosed improper governmental activities and have suffered retaliation in
return.9 Chapter 834 is needed because California State University employees
were not covered under the law applicable to UC employees."
Kenneth J. Pogue

Public Entities, Officers and Employees; economic development-Pacific
Rim
Government Code § 15364.6.1 (new).
AB 1859 (Vasconcellos); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1127

6.
See id. § 8457.12(a) (enacted by Chapter 834) (providing that the written complaint must be filed
along with a sworn statement that the contents of the written complaint are true or are believed by the affiant
to be true under penalty of pejury). The complaint must be filed within 12 months of the most recent act of
reprisal complained about. Id.
7.
Id. § 8547.12(a) (enacted by Chapter 834).
8.
See id. § 8547.12(d) (enacted by Chapter 834) (stating that nothing in § 8547.12 is intended to
prohibit the injured party from seeking a remedy if the university has not satisfactorily addressed the complaint
within 18 months).
9.
Id. § 8547.12 (enacted by Chapter 834); see SENATE FLOOR, Cohzirrraa ANALYSIs OF SB 2097,
at 1 (May 19, 1994) (identifying the purpose of SB 2097); Capitol Digest, SACRAMENTO BE, Sept. 24, 1993,
at A4 (reporting that Governor Wilson stated he prefers that California State University employees, who are
not a part of California's civil service, get protection from retaliation for whistleblowing from the university
system rather than through civil service channels). See generally Thomas v. Douglas, 877 F.2d 1428, 1432 (9th
Cir. 1989) (stating that the First Amendment does not guarantee that a whistleblower can take advantage of

a cost-free exercise of his right of free expression and cannot require employers to guarantee good feelings at
all times between employees); United States ex rel. Fine v. University of California, 821 F. Supp. 1356, 1358
(N.D.Cal. 1993) (discussing the protection of whistleblowers, and holding that no court will have jurisdiction
over a qui tam action unless the action is brought by the original source of information, and defining original
source as "an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations
are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government"); Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal. 3d
1, 1,801 P.2d 1054, 1054,276 Cal. Rptr. 303, 303 (1990) (discussing a case in which a Department of Health
Services investigator brought an action against his supervisors for wrongful termination, a violation of the
whistleblower statute, and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Gerard E. Lynch, The Lamer as
Informer, 1986 DtncaLJ. 491,491 (1986) (discussing the societal value of informers and the impact that being
a known informer has on others' perceptions); BLACK'S LAWDICIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a qul
tam action as an action whereby the plaintiff sues on behalf of the state as well as himself).
10.
SENATEFL~oR, CommrrraEANALYsts OF SB 2097, at 2 (May 19, 1994) (stating that existing law
provides a grievance procedure and legal remedies to UC employees, but not to California State University
employees).
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Existing law establishes the California State World Trade Commission' within
the California Trade and Commerce Agency. 2 The purpose of the Commission is
to encourage international trade3 and development in California.4 Existing law
requires the California Foreign Trade Office,5 created within the Commission, to,
among other things, assist the Governor, the Legislature, and state agencies in
establishing and maintaining relations with public and private representatives in
other countries.6
Chapter 1127 requires the California World Trade Commission, in consultation
with the California Offices of Trade and Investment in Tokyo, Taipei, and Hong

Kong, to conduct at least biennially a California Pacific Rim Conference for the
purpose of advancing California's awareness and knowledge of, commitment and
relationship with, and success in engaging in economic development partnerships
in the Pacific Rim beginning in 1995. 7
Chapter 1127 requires that the Conference include business, political, and
academic leaders of each of the Pacific Rim Nations and bring them together with
business, political, academic, and labor leaders of California! Chapter 1127
further requires the agenda of the Pacific Rim Conference be designed to enable
the participants to engage in dialogue to educate each other about how the State
and each of the Pacific Rim Nations can more effectively collaborate in Pacific
Rim economic development including investment, trade, and commerce?
Chapter 1127 mandates that the location of the conference alternate between
Northern and Southern California and on occasion may be located in another
Pacific Rim Nation selected by the World Trade Commission, provided that
sufficient funds are available for that purpose. 0 Chapter 1127 also authorizes the
World Trade Commission to charge Conference participants, or members of the
general public who attend the Conference, a reasonable and appropriate fee for
participation in, or attendance at, the Conference."

1.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15315(b) (West Supp. 1994) (stating the California State World Trade
Commission was created by the Governor's office and is comprised of leading representatives of California

government and industry).
2.
Id. §15311 (West Supp. 1994); see id. § 12800 (West Supp. 1994) (establishing the Trade and
Commerce Agency).
3.
See id. § 15315(b) (West Supp. 1994) (defining international trade to consist of the export and
import of agricultural, mineral, and manufacturing products, business services, and banking).

4.
5.

Id.
See id. § 15364.71 (West Supp. 1994) (creating the California Foreign Trade Office).

6.

Id.§ 15364.71(c) (Vest Supp. 1994).

7.

Id. § 15364.6.1 (enacted by Chapter 1127); see James 0. Goldsborough, California's Foreign

Policy, FOREIGN AFFAiRS, Spring 1993, at 88 (stating that California is the natural "jumping-off' point for
America's business with the Pacific Rim).
8.
CAL. GOVT CODE § 15364.6.1 (enacted by Chapter 1127).
9.
Id.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.; see SENAT FLOOR, COmrv=r
ANALYsisOFAB 1859, at 2 (Apr. 21, 1994) (stating that AB
1859 was crafted to ensure that the Conference is financially self-sustaining and that interested individuals and
entities may assist in underwriting all necessary conference costs).
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Furthermore, Chapter 1127 requires that upon the completion of the first
California Pacific Rim Conference, the California World Trade Commission must
submit a brief report to the Legislature assessing the effectiveness of the
Conference and making recommendations to improve future conferences."
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT

Chapter 1127 was enacted to enhance California's business, cultural, and

educational relationships with Pacific Rim Nations. 3 Although the California
State World Trade Commission has made progress towards improving these
relationships, the Pacific Rim Conference will further facilitate trade and other

exchanges in order to ameliorate California's economic condition. 4

Lisa R. Brenner

Public Entities, Officers, and Employees; gifts and honoraria-elected state
and local officers
Government Code §§ 53065.5, 82048.5 (new); § 89501 (amended).
AB 1542 (Umberg); 1994 STAT. Ch. 36
Under existing law, the Political Reform Act of 1974' prohibits elected state
officers2 from accepting gifts worth more than $250 from any single source

12.
13.

CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15364.6.1 (enacted by Chapter 1127).
SENATEFLOOR, COMMIrrnEEANALyss OFAB 1859, at 2 (Apr. 21, 1994).

14.

Id.; see Mazy Guthrie, How Business Views the Election, L.A. TmES, Nov. 2, 1992, at D2

(exemplifying the progress of the Commission by reporting that, in spite of the recession, California's trade
with the Pacific Rim is growing because of good business relations with Pacific Rim countries); see also
SENATE FLOOR, ComiimEE ANALYsIs OF AB 1859, at 2 (Apr. 21, 1994) (stating that according to some

experts, by the year 2010, Southeast Asia will have over one billion middle class consumers); Greg Lefevre,
Economists say Key to California's Economy Lies in Asia, CNN TRNscIuFr, Nov. 29, 1993, available in

LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (stating that a growing theory among economists is that Asian trade can
revive California's economy).

1.
See CAL. GOv'TCODE §§ 81000-91015 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994) (defining the parameters for tho
election process for state and local officials); 7 B.E. WITKN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAvi, Constitutional
Law, § 201 (9th ed. 1988) (stating that the Political Reform Act of 1974 was a measure to extensively amend
California Government Code § 81000-81016., which regulates many aspects of the election process for state
and local officials).
2.
See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 82020 (West 1993) (defining "elected state officer" as any person who
holds an elective state office or has been elected to an elective state office but has not taken office, or a person
who has been appointed to fill a vacant elective state office).
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within the same calendar year? Under prior law, local elected officeholders could
not accept any honoraria,4 or a gift' from any single source in excess of $1000 in
any calendar year, not including reasonably related actual travel expenses.6
Chapter 36 prohibits local elected officeholders, as well as elected or appointed
members of the governing board of a special district,7 or a designated employee
of a local government agency, from accepting any honoraria, or gifts from a

single source over $250 in any calendar year.8
Existing law requires elected state officers and specified elected local officers
to periodically disclose investments, interests in property, and income Chapter
36 requires each special district to annually disclose any reimbursement paid by
the special district, within the previous fiscal year, over $100 for each individual
charge for services or product received."° The reimbursement information must

annually be included in a published or printed document that is made available

for public inspection."

3.
Id. § 89504(a) (West 1993); see id.
§ 89504(b)-(d) (West 1993) (specifying that payments for travel,
advances, or reimbursements for travel and related lodging are not gifts if reasonably related to a governmental
purpose, and that gift limitation amounts will be adjusted biennially to reflect changes in the Consumer Price
Index); cf.NEv.R-v. STAT. § 281.481(l) (1991) (prohibiting a public officer or employee from accepting any
gift, service, favor, employment, engagement, or economic opportunity that would improperly influence a
reasonable person to depart from the faithful and impartial discharge of one's public duties); id.
§ 281.553
(1991) (stating that a public officer or employee is prohibited from accepting or receiving an honorarium).
4.
See CAL Gov'T CODE § 89502(b) (West 1993) (defining honorarium as any payment made in
consideration for any speech given, article published, or attendance at a private or public conference,
convention, meeting, social event, meal, or like gathering). But see id. (providing that honorarium does not
include earned income for personal services provided customarily in connection with the practice of a bona
fide business, trade, or profession, unless the sole or predominant activity of such business is malcing speeches).
5.
See id.
§ 82028(a) (West 1993) (defining gift as any payment to the extent that consideration of
equal or greater value is not received and includes a rebate or discount in the price of anything of value, unless
the rebate or discount is made in the regular course of business to the public without regard to official status).
6.
1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 84, sec. 13, at 781 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 89501).
7.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 82048.5 (enacted by Chapter 36) (defining special district to mean any
agency of the state, established for the local performance of governmental or proprietary functions within
limited boundaries, including a county service area, a maintenance district or area, an improvement district or
zone, an air pollution control district, or a redevelopment agency, but excluding a city, county, or city and
county, or school district).
8.
Id. § 89501(a)-(b) (amended by Chapter 36); see id. § 89501(b) (amended by Chapter 36)
(specifying that gift does not include reimbursement for actual travel expenses and subsistence in connection
therewith).
9.
Id. § 87203 (West 1993); see id. § 87207(a)(1) (West1993) (providing that gifts over $250 are
included as income); see also id. § 87200 (West 1993) (listing the elected state officers and local elected
officers required to submit reports disclosing reportable income and gifts); id. §§ 87202-87210 (West 1993)
(describing the specific disclosure and timing requirements).

10.
Id. § 53065.5 (enacted by Chapter 36); see id. (stating that an individual charge includes, but is not
limited to, one meal, lodging for one day, transportation, or a registration fee paid to any employee or member
of the governing body of the district); see also Eric Bailey & Mark Platte, Wilson Signs Bill RestrictingGifts
to Officials, L.A. TMEs, Apr. 9, 1994, at Al (stating that special districts will be required to make a public
report if an employee or elected directors were reimbursed with taxpayer dollars totalling more than $100 for
meals, lodging, travel expenses or other costs).
11.
CAL GOV'T CODE § 53065.5 (enacted by Chapter 36).
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INTERPRETIVE COMMENT

Chapter 36 was specifically sponsored to curb special district executives and
employees from squandering taxpayer money, and to provide for the public
disclosure of budgeting, revenue, and expenditures by local elected
officeholders. 2 In addition, Chapter 36 has reduces the dollar amount of gifts
received by local elected officeholders from $1000 to $250 from any single
source within a calendar year, and creates a uniform dollar cap for gifts received
by both state and local elected officeholders. 3
Cary G. Hipps

Public Entities, Officers and Employees; improper influence-action on
entitlements
Government Code § 87104 (new).
AB 3444 (Margolin); 1994 STAT. Ch. 274
Existing law prohibits public officials' in state or local government2 from using

their official positions3 to influence governmental decisions regarding subjects in
which they have financial interests.4 Existing law additionally prohibits members

12.
See ASSEMBLYCOMMITEEONLocGovERNmENr, CoWMMrTEANALYSISOFAB 1542, at 1 (Apr.
21, 1993) (stating that this bill was introduced in response to an incident involving two executives of the Santa
Margarita Water District who allegedly incurred over $160,000 in meals, hotels, limousines, first-class airfares,
and other perks, as well as allegedly accepted more than $40,000 in gifts).
13.
CAL Gov'T CODE§ 89501 (enacted by Chapter 36); see id. §§ 87200, 87207 (West 1993) (defining
the disclosure requirements for elected and appointed officials); see also Bailey & Platte, supra note 10, at Al
(quoting Governor Wilson as stating that Chapter 36 will hold local officials to the "same tough standards"
required of state lawmakers for gifts and perks).

1.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 82048 (West 1993) (defining a public official as any member, officer,
employee or consultant of a state or local government agency, excluding judges and court commissioners).
2.
See id. § 82041 (West 1993) (defining local government agencies as including counties, cities, or
districts of any kind).
3.
See id. § 82004 (West 1993) (defining an agency official as any member, officer, employee or

consultant of a state agency who participates inadministrative actions inany capacity other than those purely
clerical, secretarial, or ministerial).
4.
Id. § 87100 (West 1993); see id. § 87103 (West 1993) (defining a financial interest in a decision
as existing where it is reasonably foreseeable that the decision will have a specific material financial effect
upon the official or his or her family); see also Commission on Cal. State Gov't Org. & Economy v. Fair
Political Practices Comm'n, 75 Cal. App. 3d 716,723, 142 Cal. Rptr. 468,472 (1977) (holding that a violation
of conflict of interest laws occurs, not only when officials participate in decisions, but when they influence
them either directly or indirectly); Witt v. Morrow, 70 Cal. App. 3d 817, 822, 139 Cal. Rptr. 161, 164 (1977)
(holding that the financial impact must be material, and stating that the purpose of the Political Reform Act
of 1974 was to prevent government officials from participating in decisions about which they might not be
totally objective due to potential benefits accruing to one with whom he or she is employed).
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of the State Legislature, elected state officers, or administrative agency employees

who participate in the making of decisions having financial repercussions from
acting as agents, attorneys, or representatives to the Legislature, for a period of

one year after leaving office.5
Chapter 274 specifically includes, within the scope of these Political Reform
Act of 19746 proscriptions, members of state agency advisory committees, thus
placing these officials within the ambit of existing conflict of interest laws.
INmRPRETIVE COMMENT

Other states have generally not seen fit to extend their code provisions
regarding the use of official positions for personal gain to specifically include
advisory committee members! However, Chapter 274 was enacted in response
to a recent incident in which Cal-Mortgage Insurance9 extended a $167 million
loan guarantee to a hospital, on the recommendation of an Assembly Health
Advisory Committee member, which resulted in a costly default and suspension
of the twenty-five-year-old loan guarantee program.'0 Also, the enactment of
Chapter 274 followed a three-month Los Angeles Times investigation reporting
that the program was loosely run, leaving it vulnerable to manipulation by private
interests." The Times investigation also found that the loan guarantee program

5.
6.
7.
official as

CAL. GOV'T CODE § 87406(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1994).

See id. §§ 81000-91015 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994) (establishing the Political Reform Act of 1974).
Id § 87104 (enacted by Chapter 274); see id § 87104(b) (enacted by Chapter 274) (defining public
including any member of an advisory committee of a state agency, whether that committee was

created by statute or otherwise).
8.

See e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-10-61 (1994) (extending prohibitions of bribery and corrupt influence

to public servants generally); id. § 36-25-5(a) (1991) (prohibiting public officials from using their official
positions or offices for personal gain); ALAsKA STAT. § 39.50.090 (1987) (defining public official, in the
context of prohibited acts, as including chairmen and members of all commissions and boards created by statute
or administrative action as agencies of the state); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1461 (1992) (referring generally to
public officials in the code's provisions relating to conflicts of interest); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A,
§ 23 (West 1990) (including in its regulations of the conduct of public officials and employees, a prohibition
on the use of official positions to secure privileges for officers or employees of a state, county, or municipal
agency); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 74 (McKinney 1988) (extending prohibitions on improper influence to
legislative employees, but not specifically referring to advisory committee members); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 102.03 (Anderson Supp. 1993) (referring, in its provisions regarding the ethics of public officers, to present
or former public officials or employees, including members or employees of the general assembly); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 19.45 (West Supp. 1993) (providing a code of ethics for public officials and employees which refers
generally to state public officials).
9.

See Irene Wielawski, State to Reopen Battered Mortgage Guarantee Unit, L.A. TIMES, May 4,

1994, at A16 (describing Cal-Mortgage as a little-known 25-year-old state agency organized under the
California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development for the purpose of helping nonprofit health
care providers to obtain low-interest loans by guaranteeing the debt with assets from the state treasury).
10.
SENATE FLooR, CoMmirrrEEANALYsis oFAB 3444, at 2 (June 29, 1994); see id. (citing a default

by Triad Hospital, Inc. of Encino, California, as the impetus for AB 3444); see also Irene Wielawski, Triad
HospitalLoan Default Spurs Reform Bill, L.A. TumEs, Mar. 3, 1994, at B3 (stating that Triad Hospital's loan
was approved over the objections of a Cal-Mortgage staff analyst on the recommendation of an advisory loan
committee member also acting as a loan broker, thus prompting the introduction of AB 3444).
11.
Irene Wielawski, QuestionsCloudLoan Default in State Programi, L.A. TWs, May 1, 1994, at Al.
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contained procedural anomalies which resulted in allegations of political

influence-peddling and attempted bribery, an investigation by the state attorney
general, and a lawsuit.12
Chapter 274 addresses these problems in part by specifically prohibiting

advisory committee members from attempting to influence their committees on
contracts, grants, loans, licenses, permits, and other entitlements if they are
compensated for such activities. 3
Marl.IV Owens

Public Entities, Officers and Employees; Military Base Reuse Authority Act
Government Code §§ 67800, 67801, 67810, 67811, 67812, 67813, 67820,
67821, 67822, 67823,67824, 67825, 67826, 67827, 67828, 67829, 67830,
67831, 67840, 67840.1, 67840.2, 67840.3, 67840.4, 67840.5, 67840.6,

67840.7, 67841, 67842,67843, 67844,67845, 67846,67847,67850,67851,
67860, 67870 (new).
AB 3759 (Gotch); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1165
(Effective August 23, 1994)
Under existing law, cities and counties are authorized to plan and control land
use within their jurisdiction.'
Chapter 1165 enacts the Military Base Reuse Authority Act.2 This act
authorizes cities and counties to establish a military base reuse authority, to
prepare, adopt, finance, and implement a plan for the transition of a military base
from military to civilian use.4

12.
Wielawski, supra note 11, at Al.
13.
CAL GOV'TCODE § 87104(a) (enacted by Chapter 274); see SENATE FLOOR, COSFMEE ANALYLS
OF AB 3444, at 2 (June 29, 1994) (citing testimony at a hearing of the Assembly Committee on Health
regarding misconduct by the loan advisory committee member in the Triad incident as prompting AB 3444's
provisions regarding advisory committee member influence peddling).

1.
CAL GOV'T CODE § 65300 (West Supp. 1994); see id. (authorizing cities and counties to plan and
control land use within their jurisdiction according to planning and zoning law); see also id. § 6514.5 (West
Supp. 1994) (authorizing joint powers agreements between two or more public agencies); id. § 60000 (West
1983) (authorizing the levying of certain taxes).
2.
Id. § 67800 (enacted by Chapter 1165); cf. H.R. 589, 13th Leg., 2d Sess., 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 323
(creating the Florida Defense Conversion and Transition Commission).
3.
See CAL GOV'T CODE § 67820 (enacted by Chapter 1165) (listing the provisions of the Military
Base Reuse Authority).
4.
CAL GOv'TCODE §§ 67800-67870 (enacted by Chapter 1165); see Greg Lucas, Bill Sets Up Fort
Ord Conversion: Eight Cities Will Determine Fate of 3,500 Key Acres, S.F. CHRON., May 3, 1994, at AIS

(indicating that a California State University campus, a wildlife habitat, and a state park may replace Fort Ord
Army Base); Paul Schnitt, Job Influx After Castle Closes? Skepticism Reigns, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 5, 1993,
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Additionally, Chapter 1165 authorizes the governing board of a Military Base
Reuse Authority to: (1) Acquire and dispose of existing real property and
facilities in the military base's territory; 5 (2) construct new public capital facilities
within that territory;6 and (3) levy assessments, reassessments, special taxes, or
development fees and to issue bonds to finance projects pursuant to specified
legislative acts.7
Chapter 1165 also requires a county or city that has territory occupied by a
base for which an authority has adopted a reuse plan, to submit general plans,
zoning ordinances, and materials necessary for implementing the reuse plan!
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT

Because of cutbacks in the Department of Defense funding, California is in the

process of losing 22 major bases and 200,000 military and civilian jobs (directly

and indirectly) throughout the state.9 To reverse the harmful economic effects, the
military bases slated for closure are in the process of being transformed.'0

at El (reporting that among the many uses being proposed for the converted bases is an aircraft maintenance
firm); Dana Wilkie, Officials Get Tips on Converting ClosedBases, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRtB., July 31, 1993,
at A4 (stating that Mather Air Force Base may be used for a golf course, housing for the homeless, homes for
low-and moderate-income families, a cargo airport, flight training school, or a law enforcement training center).
5.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 67842 (enacted by Chapter 1165); see id. § 67810(b) (enacted by Chapter
1165) (declaring that a basewide facility is a public capital facility that, in the judgment of the board, is
important to the overall reuse of the base, and has significance beyond any single city or the unincorporated
area of a county).
6.
Id. § 67843(a) (enacted by Chapter 1165); see id. § 67810(h) (enacted by Chapter 1165) (defining
public capital facilities as all public capital facilities described in the authority reuse plan including, but not
limited to, roads, freeways, ramps, air transportation facilities and freight hauling and handling facilities,
sewage and water conveyance and treatment facilities, school library and other educational facilities, and
recreational facilities, that could most efficiently and conveniently be planned, negotiated, financed, or
constructed by the authority to further the integrated future use of the military base).
7.
Id. § 67843(c) (enacted by Chapter 1165); see id. § 67843(c)(1)-(12) (enacted by Chapter 1165)
(specifying the legislative acts which assessments, taxes, fees, or bonds may be issued in accordance with: The
Improvement Act of 1911; the Improvement Bond Act of 1915; the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913; the
Benefit Assessment Act of 1982; the Landscape and Lighting Act of 1972; the Integrated Financing District
Act; the Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982; the Infrastructure Financing District Act; the MarksRoos Local Bond Pooling Act of 1985; the Revenue Bond Act of 1941; fire suppression assessments; and
habitat maintenance assessments).
8.
Id. § 67840.1 (enacted by Chapter 1165).
9.
Rick DelVecchio, Scornful Assessment of Base Conversions, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 26, 1994, at A4;
see ASSEmLY COMMrTEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENr, COpmlnrnEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3759, at 4 (Apr. 20, 1994)
(reporting that a closed military base can result in closed businesses and lost jobs, reduced tax revenues and
services, and high vacancy rates); Phillip J. LaVelle & Ruth L. McKinnie, County, City Wage MiramarDog
Fight, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 20, 1994, at Al (reporting that base closures have an extreme negative
impact in its area and that it takes more than six years to close a base and convert to other uses); see also
Anthony J. Principi, The Miramarof Tomorrow Two Views; Conversion Makes FinancialSense, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRiB., Apr. 20, 1994, at B7 (explaining that the United States Senate has passed a budget resolution
calling for $43 billion in additional spending cuts, of which 60%-75% will be targeted toward defense

spending).

10.

See John Marelius, Goldingto Lead Wilson Panelon Base Conversion, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,

July 13, 1993, at Al (stating that Governor Wilson named San Diego Mayor, Susan Golding, as head of the
Military Base Reuse Task Force in order to promote quick conversion of the soon-to-be-closed military bases
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Chapter 1165 facilitates this process by authorizing the establishment of
authorities that focus resources on military bases with proper planning and
environmental analyses, without diverting attention from "existing local, regional,

and state economic needs."" In addition, Chapter 1165 acts as a general
authorization to form a Military Base Reuse Act that is applicable to all military

bases in the California region, thus eliminating the need for special legislation for
each base. 2
Marnie L Smith

Public Entities, Officers and Employees; Political Reform Act-financial
interest in governmental decisions

Government Code § 87103 (amended).
SB 1602 (Lockyer); 1994 STAT. Ch. 386
The Political Reform Act of 1974' bars public officials 2 from making decisions

in which they have a financial interest.3 Existing law defines an official as having
to civilian uses).
ASSEMBLY CoMmIrrrEE ON LOCAL GOVERNmmIrr, CoMmIT=rEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3759, at 4 (Apr.
11.
20, 1994).
ld.
12.

See CAL GOV'TCODE §§ 81000, 81001, 81002 (,Vest 1993) (setting out the scope and purpose of
1.
the Political Reform Act of 1974); see also Socialist Workers 1974 California Campaign Comm. v. Brown,
53 Cal. App. 3d 879, 888, 125 Cal. Rptr. 915,921 (1975) (stating that the purpose of the Political Reform Act
of 1974 is to inform the electorate and to prevent corruption of government officials).
2.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 82048 (West 1993) (defining public official as every member, officer,
employee, or consultant of a state or local government agency, not including judges and court commissioners);
CAL- CODE REGs. tit 2, § 18700 (1990) (defining public official as a member, officer, employee, or consultant
of a state or local government agency, including individuals who perform the same or substantially the same
duties as an individual holding an office or a position listed in California Government Code § 87200); see also
Rotman, Doreet, et. al., 10 FPPC 1, 1 (No. 86-001, May 12, 1987) (holding that individuals on redevelopment
project area committees are members of local governmental agencies and thus public officials); Maloney, R.J.,
District Attorney, Glenn County, 3 FPPC 69,70 (No. 76-082, Aug. 18, 1977) (holding that a county surveyorengineer, when performing engineering and survey work for the county on a contract basis, is not a public
official); Siegel, Samuel, City Attorney, Pico Rivera, 3 FPPC 62, 67 (No. 76-054, July 6, 1977) (holding that
members of the board of directors of a water development agency corporation are public officials).
CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 81000, 81001, 81002 (West 1993); see id. § 87103 (West 1993) (defining
3.
financial interest as an interest in a decision when it is reasonably foreseeable that the decision will have a
material financial effect on him or her distinguishable from the effect on the general public); see also
Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 73 Cal. App. 3d 650, 658, 141 Cal. Rptr. 8, 12
(1977) (holding that even if the provisions of the Political Reform Act allow an official to participate in a
decision, that official still must disclose his or her interests related to the matter as required by the other
sections of the Political Reform Act); Witt v. Morrow, 70 Cal. App. 3d 817, 822-23, 139 Cal. Rptr. 161, 164
(1977) (stating that the whole purpose of the Political Reform Act of 1974 is to stop government officials from
participating in decisions in which they have a financial interest); 64 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 795, 800 (1981)
(concluding that there is no conflict of interest when a county supervisor, who is also a real estate agent,
represents a party in a land deal that is contingent upon the issuance of some permit by the county); Sankey,
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a financial interest in a governmental decision as when the official is able to
reasonably foresee that the decision will have a material financial effect on him
or her, which is distinguishable from the effect it will have on the general public.4
Chapter 386 requires the Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC)5 to
biennially adjust the value of a gift6 which would be considered by law to give an
official a financial interest in a decision involving the donor of the gift!

Iris, Member, State Board of Equalization, 2 FPPC 157, 166 (No. 76-071, Nov. 3, 1976) (holding that an
official who has a half interest in a piece of land leased by a utility company must disqualify herself from
participating in the assessment of that property and the assessment of any other property owned by the utility
company); Oglesby, Thomas W., City Manager, Antioch, 1 FPPC 71, 81 (No. 75-083, July 2, 1975) (holding
that a city councilmember would be barred from participating in a decision regarding the adoption of a
redevelopment plan because of his ownership of property near the plan and his interest in the real estate firm
involved with the plan); cf. 18 U.S.C.A. § 208 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that it is illegal for any federal
official or employee to make a decision, recommendation, or otherwise participate in proceedings in which he,
his immediate family, or general partner has a financial interest); 18 U.S.C.A. § 216 (West Supp. 1994)
(providing the penalties for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 208); ALA. Co §§ 36-25-2, 36-25-5 (1994) (reporting
the legislative findings and declarations of the Alabama State Legislature that it is essential for the law to
protect against conflicts of interest for public officials, and prohibiting them from using their official positions
for gain); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-84 (West Supp. 1994) (prohibiting public officials from participating
in govemmental decisions in which they have a financial interest); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-2 (1993) (declaring
that it is the policy of the state to protect the integrity of the political process, and one way to do so is to hold
accountable officials who are influenced in their roles by their private interests); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
42:1112 (West 1990) (barring any public official from participating in a transaction in which he or she has a
personal substantial economic interest); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-16-9 (1993) (prohibiting any public officer or
employee from having personal investments in any business entity which would create a substantial conflict
between the official's private and public interests). See generally 52 CAL. JUR. 3D Public Officers and
Employees § 175 (1979) (describing the Political Reform Act, the Fair Political Practices Commission,
decisions on the subject, and relevant states cases); John E. Theuman, Annotation, Validity and Construction
of Orders and Enactments Requiring Public Officers and Employees, or Candidatesfor Public Office, to
Disclose FinancialConditions,Interests, or Relationships,22 A.L.R. 4TH 237, 240 (1983) (reporting on state
and federal cases that have ruled on the validity of financial disclosure requirements placed on public officers
and employees); Lewis J. Heisman, Annotation, What ConstitutesActs Affecting PersonalFinancialInterest
Within Meaning of)8 USCS § 208(a), Penalizing Participationby Government Enployees in Mattersin Which
They Have PersonalFinancialInterest,59 A.L.R. FED. 872, 872 (1982) (discussing the federal conflict of
interest laws).
4.
CAL. GOV'TCODE § 87103 (West 1993); see Downey Cares v. Downey Community Dev. Comm'n,
196 Cal. App. 3d 983,988,242 Cal. Rptr. 272, 275 (1987); Affordable Hous. Alliance v. Feinstein, 179 Cal.
App. 3d 484,488,224 Cal. Rptr. 557, 559 (1986); Citizens for Oxnard v. Maron, 145 Cal. App. 3d 702,707,

193 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649 (1983); Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. City Council of Los Angeles, 26
Cal.3d 938,946, 164 Cal. Rptr. 255,259 (1980); Wittv. Morrow 70 Cal. App. 3d 817, 821, 139 Cal. Rptr. 161,
163 (1977) (illustrating cases which have upheld California Government Code § 87103).
5.
See CAL GOV'TCODE §§ 83100, 83111 (West 1993) (creating and describing the duties of the Fair
Political Practices Commission).
6.
See id. § 82028(a) (West 1993) (defining gift as any payment to the extent that consideration of
equal or greater value is not received and includes a rebate or discount in the price of anything of value, unless
the rebate or discount is made in the regular course of business to members of the public without regard to
official status); id. § 82028(b)(l)-(6) (West 1993) (excluding from the definition of gift, gifts which are
returned to the donor unused, informational materials, gifts from an individual's family, campaign
contributions, any devise or inheritance, and personalized plaques and trophies valued at less than $250).
7.
Id. § 87 103(e) (amended by Chapter 386); see id. (requiring the Fair Political Practices Commission
to adjust the limitation on the value of gifts as it does in California Government Code § 89504(d) to reflect
changes in the Consumer Price Index); see also id. § 89504(d) (West 1993) (requiring the FPPC to annually
adjust the limitation on the value of gifts acceptable by a public official to reflect changes in the Consumer
Price Index); 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 386, sec. 2, at 1860 (fixing the amount of the gift limit in California
Government Code § 87103(e) as $270, effective Jan. 1, 1995, until the amount is adjusted by the FPPC in the
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Chapter 386 brings the Political Reform Act conflict of interest gift threshold

into conformity with the gift limit set by the FPPC.' This is done to avoid
inadvertent violations of the regulations by officials, possibly caused by a
discrepancy between the two values? The recent attention given to political
reform and ethics in government has helped to push the Political Reform Act into

the spotlight, and Chapter 386 is a measure designed to
minimize the possibility
0
of innocent violations of its conflict of interest rules.'

Jason Decker
Public Entities, Officers and Employees; powers of arrest-

federal officers

Penal Code §§ 830.8, 847 (amended).
AB 1610 (Boland); 1994 STAT. Ch. 424
Existing law provides that federal law enforcement officers and criminal
investigators are not California peace officers,' but allows them to exercise the
powers of arrest2 for violations of local or state laws, so long as these officers and

same amount as required by California Government Code § 89504(e)).
8.
SENATEFLOOR, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1602, at 2 (Apr. 21, 1994); see id. (stating that there
are two different limitations; the first on gifts that may be accepted, and the other on gifts that must be reported
and indicating that this difference may lead to confusion and violations of California Government Code
§§ 87103 and 89504); see also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 89504(d) (%Vest 1993) (requiring the FPPC to annually
adjust the maximum value of a gift which can be accepted by a public official to reflect changes in the
Consumer Price Index).
9.
SENATE FLOOR, COMMrniE ANALYSIS OFSB 1602, at 2 (Apr. 21, 1994).
10.
Id. See generally Tupper Hill, Demos Urge Probe of Wilson Condo; Private Group Leases LA

LtauryHome for Governor,S.F. EXAMINER, July 12, 1994, at A5 (describing the call by state Democrats for
a FPPC probe into the condominium rented by private parties for Governor Pete Wilson's use); Mark Platte,
The Winds of Reform Sweep Across County; Politics: Supervisors, Cities, Special Districts, and Even
DisneylandClean Up TheirActs. Spate of Scandal Suddenly Puts EthicsOfficially Back in Action, L.A. TIMEs,
May 23, 1993, at BI (describing recent political reform efforts in Orange County); James R. Sutton, Los
Angeles' Tough New EthicsLaw, CAIUFORNIA JOURNAL, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File, Aug.
1, 1993 (describing the measures the City of Los Angeles has taken towards political ethics reform).

1.
See CAL PENAL CODE §§ 830-832.6 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994) (identifying the extent of authority
and the duties of peace officers); see also id. § 830 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that any person who comes
within the provisions of Chapter 4.5 (commencing with § 830) of the California Penal Code, and who
otherwise meets all standards imposed by law on a peace officer, notwithstanding any other provision of law,
is a peace officer). The restriction of peace officer functions of any public officer or employee does not affect
his or her status for purposes of retirement. Id.
2.
Id. § 834 (West 1985); see id. (defining arrest as taking a person into custody, in a case and in the
manner authorized by law, and providing that an arrest may be made by a peace officer or by a private person);
id. § 836 (West Supp. 1994) (stating the circumstances under which a peace officer may make an arrest without
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investigators are enforcing federal criminal laws and are exercising the arrest
powers only incidental to the performance of their federal duties? Existing law
also provides that the state shall not be liable for a state officer's actions or failure
to act while performing a discretionary function on behalf of the state or local
agency during emergency operations.4 Existing law further provides that no peace

officer, acting within the scope of his authority, shall face liability for false arrest
or false imprisonment.5
Chapter 424 mandates that federal officers or federal criminal investigators are
not California peace officers but may exercise the powers of arrest of a peace
officer under certain circumstances. 6 The officers may exercise the arrest powers
incidental to the performance of their federal duties, when requested by a
California law enforcement agency to be involved in a joint task force or criminal
investigation, or when probable cause exists which gives an officer reason to
believe that a public offense involving immediate danger to persons or property
has been committed.7 Chapter 424 provides that federal officers, during a state of
war emergency or a state of emergency, may exercise the powers of arrest of a
peace officer for violations of state or local laws.' Chapter 424 would extend the

protection from civil liability granted to state peace officers, acting in a
discretionary function or acting within the scope of the officer's authority, to
9
federal officers.

warrant); see also CAl.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1984) (allowing an officer, upon probable cause,
to take into custody a person with a mental disorder and permitting the officer to place the person into a county
and State Department of Mental Health approved facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation).
3.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.8(a) (amended by Chapter 424).
4.
Id. § 836 (West Supp. 1994); see id. (discussing arrest without a warrant); see also CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 8558 (West 1992) (defining state of war emergency, state of emergency, and local emergency);
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (providing that government officials performing
discretionary functions have qualified immunity, shielding them from civil liability for damages so long as their
actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are to have allegedly violated); see
also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (stating that a qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law").
5.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 847 (amended by Chapter 424); see id. (providing that an arrest is within the
scope of authority if the arrest was lawful, when the officer had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was
lawful, when the arrest warrant was based upon reasonable cause, or when the arrest was made pursuant to
California Penal Code §§ 142, 838, or 839); George v. City of Long Beach, 973 F.2d 706,710 (9th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing that a lack of probable cause must be found before officers can be held liable for false arrest and
false imprisonment). See generallyJennie Rhine, Note, Civil Liabilityfor Illegal Arrests and Confinements in
California,19 HAsTiNGs LJ. 974 (1968) (commenting that there is no exact formula to use when determining
whether or not an officer had probable cause to make an arrest, but that the court must look at the facts as they
appeared to the officer at the time of the arrest).
6.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.8(a) (amended by Chapter 424).
7.
Id.
8.
Id. § 830.8(d) (amended by Chapter 424).
9.
Id.
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Chapter 424 was introduced in response to the civil unrest in the Los Angeles
area during 1992.0 During the Los Angles riots, it became necessary for federal
law enforcement personnel to be sworn in before they could enforce state and
local laws." Chapter 424 would give greater arrest powers to federal law
enforcement officers for local crimes in times of emergency. 2 Chapter 424 would
also extend the qualified immunities granted state peace officers to federal
23
officers, thus allowing them to enforce local laws without fear of liability.
Kenneth J. Pogue

Public Entities, Officers and Employees; public records inspectionLegislative Counsel public databank
Government Code §§ 6254, 9075 (amended).
AB 2547 (Bowen); 1994 STAT. Ch. 82
Existing law, the California Public Records Act,' requires that public records2

be open to public inspection during the office hours of the state or local agency
and that every citizen has the right to inspect any public record. 3 Existing law

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1610, at 1 (Jan. 18,
10.
1984); see Rich Connell & Ted Rohrlich, Webster to Head Probeof PoliceResponse to Riot, L.A. TIMES, May
12, 1992, at Al (discussing the damage and injuries resulting from the Los Angeles riots in response to the
verdicts in the Rodney King beating case).
SENATE FLOOR, COMMEIrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1610, at 2 (Aug. 18, 1994); see id. (stating that AB
11.
1610 would facilitate efforts involving joint federal, state, and local law enforcement).
ASSEMBLYCOMMTrrEEONPUBLICSAFEY1Y, CoMMriTEEANALYSIS OFAB 1610, at I (Jan. 18, 1984).
12.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.8(d) (amended by Chapter 424); ASSEMBLY COMMrrEE ON PUBLIC
13.
SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 1610, at 2 (Jan. 18, 1994) (discussing the extension of-protection from
liability for federal investigators).

1.
See CAL. GOV'TCODE §§ 6250-6305 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994) (regulating the inspection of public
records).
See id. § 6252(d) (West Supp. 1994) (defining public records as including any writing containing
2.
information relating to the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or
local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics). Public records in the custody of, or maintained by,
the Governor's office means any writing prepared on or after January 6, 1975. Id. See id. § 6252(e) (West
Supp. 1994) (defining writing).
3.
Id. § 6250 (West 1980); see id. § 6255 (,Vest 1980) (stating that, in enacting this chapter, the
Legislature, mindful of the right of individuals to privacy, finds and declares that access to information
concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this
state); id. § 9075 (amended by Chapter 82) (stating that nothing in this article shall be construed to invalidate
or affect the operation of California Government Code §§ 10207, 10208, 10525, and 10526, or Temporary
Joint Rule 37 of the Senate and Assembly in effect on the effective date of this article, or to require the
disclosure of records that are listed in those sections); see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040 (Vest Supp. 1994)
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makes records in the custody of the Legislative Counsel4 exempt from the public
right of inspection.5 Existing law also requires the Legislative Counsel to make
available to the public specified information6 regarding bills, the proceedings of
the houses and committees of the Legislature, statutory enactments, and the
California Constitution by way of a nonproprietary, nonprofit cooperative public
computer network.7 Chapter 82 extends the right of inspection provided by the
California Public Records Act to cover those records in the public data base
maintained by the Legislative Counsel!

States or a statute of this state; or (2) disclosure of the information is against the public interest because there
is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure;
but no privilege may be claimed under this provision if any person authorized to do so has consented to the
information being disclosed in the proceeding). In determining whether disclosure of the information is against
the public interest, the interest of the public as a party in the outcome of the proceeding may not be considered.
Id.; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6255 (West 1980) (providing that the agency must justify withholding any record by
demonstrating that the record in question is exempt or that on the facts of the particular case the public interest
served by not making the record public clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record);
id. § 10208 (West 1992) (providing for the prohibition against revealing matter); id. § 10525 (West 1992)
(regulating confidentiality in the destruction or filing of records); id. § 10526 (West 1992) (making it a
misdemeanor to divulge restricted information); Braun v. City of Taft, 154 Cal. App. 3d 332, 346, 201 Cal.
Rptr. 654, 662 (1984) (stating that each individual case should undergo a weighing process that balances the
public interest that is served in not disclosing the information against the public interest served in disclosing
the information); Los Angles Police Dept. v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 3d 661, 668, 135 Cal. Rptr. 575,
579 (1977) (noting that if a record is accessible to all persons, a person who may be the subject of a particular
record does not have any greater right to examine, or prevent disclosure, than any other person); Cook v. Craig,
55 Cal. App. 3d 773, 781, 127 Cal. Rptr. 712, 716 (1976) (stating that, like the federal Freedom of Information
Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) upon which it was modeled, the general policy of the California Public Record Act favors
disclosure); Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 652-53, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106, 110 (1974) (listing
among the objectives of the Public Records Act the "preservation of islands of privacy upon the broad seas of

enforced disclosure"); Edward M.Schaffer et a., A Look at the California Records Act and its Exemptions,
4 GOLDEN GATE U. L.REV. 203, 212 (1974) (stating that the California Public Records act was modeled after
the Federal Freedom of Information Act and attempts to balance the individual right to privacy with the public
right to know); id. at 215 (stating that the California exemptions place the burden of proof on the agency
resisting disclosure of its documents). See generally 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1977) (providing the agency rules,
opinions, orders, records, and proceedings that the federal government must use and follow).
4.
See CAL. GOV'TCODE §§ 10200-10248 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (listing the duties and powers
of the Legislative Counsel).
5.
1975 Cal. Stat. ch. 1246, sec. 1, at 3206 (amending CAL. GOV'T CODE §9075); see id. (providing
that the information in the custody of or maintained by the Legislative Counsel shall be protected).
6.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 10248 (West Supp. 1994) (mandating that the Legislative Counsel make
the following information available: The legislative calendar, the schedule of legislative hearings, a list of
matters pending on the floors of both houses of the Legislature, a list of the committees of the Legislature and
their members, texts of bills, bill history, voting information concerning all bills, any veto message concerning
a bill, the California Codes, the California Constitution, and many other documents).
7.
Id.
8.
Id. § 6254(m) (amended by Chapter 82); see id. § 9075(0 (amended by Chapter 82) (mandating that
Chapter 82 does not require the release of records in the custody of or maintained by the Legislative Counsel,
except those records in the public data base maintained by the Legislative Counsel that are described in
California Government Code § 10248). Legislative records may not be transferred to the custody of the
Legislative Counsel to evade the disclosure provisions. Id.; see id. § 10248 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that
the Legislative Counsel must make certain legislative information available on a public computer network);
see also SENATE FLOOR, Co
rMmm
ANALYSIS OF AB 2547, at 1 (May 5, 1994) (stating that these records are
public records pursuant to the California Public Records Act and the Legislative Open Records Act). See
generally California Government Code §§ 9070-9079 (West 1992) (identifying the legislative intent,
definitions, and rules in the Legislative Open Records Act).
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Chapter 82 was enacted to clarify that the legislative information available in
the public data bank maintained by Legislative Counsel is available to the public
under the Public Records and Legislative Open Records Acts?
Kenneth J. Pogue
Public Entities, Officers, and Employees; public utilities-disclosure of
customer information
Public Utilities Code §§ 588, 2112.5 (new).
AB 2333 (Morrow); 1994 STAT. Ch. 112
Under existing law, the California Parent Locator Service' may obtain
customer service information2 from public utilities3 to assist in locating the
parents of missing children.4 Chapter 112 requires telephone, gas, and electric
utilities to provide specified customer information 5 to inspectors and investigators

9.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6254, 9075 (amended by Chapter 82); see SENATE FLOOR, COMMITrEE
ANALYSIS oFAB 2547, at 2 (May 5. 1994) (stating that according to the author, the purpose of the bill is to

clarify what data is available to the public by way of the public data bank); see also Philip Hager, Court
RestrictsAccess to Governor'sCalendar,LA. TIMEs, July 23, 1991, at A3, (quoting Justice Armand Arabian
of the California Supreme Court as saying that "[aiccess to a broad array of opinions and the freedom to seek
all points of view, to exchange ideas, and to discuss policies in confidence is essential to effective governance
in a representative democracy").

1.
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11478.5(a) (Vest Supp. 1994) (stating that the California Parent
Locator Service is part of the Department of Justice); cf 42 U.S.C. § 11602 (Vest Supp. 1994) (stating that
the Federal Parent Locator Service is established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services). See
generally Mary Madigan, Note, Child Snatching:Remedies in the FederalCourts,41 VASii. & LEE L. REV.
185, 195 (1984) (stating that the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) authorizes the use of the Federal
Parent Locator Service to assist in locating parents who have abducted their children).
2.
See CAL. War. & INST. CODE § 11478.5(c)(1) (West Supp. 1994) (explaining that obtainable
customer service information includes full name, address, telephone number, date and place of birth, and social
security number).
3.
See CAL PUB. UTL CODE § 216(a) (West Supp. 1994) (defining public utility); see also 73B CJ.S.
Public Utility § 2 (1983) (defining public utility as a business organization that regularly supplies the public
with some commodity or service, such as electricity, gas, water, transportation, or telephone and telegraph
service).
4.
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 11478.5(c)(l)-(4) (West Supp. 1994); see id. § 11478.5(a) (West Supp.
1994) (specifying that parent includes a putative parent, spouse, or former spouse).
5.
See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 588(a) (enacted by Chapter 112) (providing for the disclosure of the
full name, date of birth, social security number, address, prior address, forwarding address, and place of
employment of customers, as well as the date of service instituted, terminated, or suspended by, of utility
customers to the extent such information is stored in the utility's computer data base or records).
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employed inthe office of a district attorney6 when such information is needed to
assist in the investigation of missing or abducted children!
Under Chapter 112, only those investigators and inspectors whose names have
been submitted to the utility may request and receive customer information!
Chapter 112 provides that this information may be obtained without a warrant,
but only after the submission of an affidavit of probable cause 9 to be retained by
the utility."t Chapter 112 specifies that information pertaining to customer usage
of the services provided by the utility may not be obtained without a court order
or subpoena. 1
Under Chapter 112, the inspectors and investigators requesting and receiving
customer information must maintain the confidentiality of the information
obtained, and must not use it for any purpose other than that expressly allowed
under Chapter 112.12 Chapter 112 also establishes that the utility that releases the
information will not be subject to criminal or civil liability for the proper release

6.
See id. (enacted by Chapter 112) (providing that only investigators and inspectors as defined by
California Penal Code § 830.1 who are employed by a district attorney may obtain the specified customer
information).
7.
Id. § 588(a) (enacted by Chapter 112); see id. § 588(b)(l)-(6) (enacted by Chapter 112) (requiring
that the specified information be used for the location or recovery of a minor child or abductor, coconspirator,
or aider and abetter of the continuing crime of child abduction or concealment); cf.42 U.S.C.A. § 663(a)(1)
(West 1991) (authorizing the use of the Parent Locator Service to locate a parent in the case of a parental
kidnapping of a child). See generally Madigan, supra note 1, at 195 (describing the functions of the Parent

Locator Service).
8.
CAL PUB. UTI. CODE § 588(b)(2) (enacted by Chapter 112); see id. (stating that it is the district
attorney's office's responsibility to ensure that current lists of personnel authorized to request and receive
customer information are provided to the utilities).
9.
See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (stating that probable cause exists where

the facts and circumstances within the police officer's knowledge and of which they have reasonably
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
an offense has been or is being committed), reh'g denied,338 U.S. 839 (1949); People v. Stout, 66 Cal. 2d
184, 193,424 P.2d 704,710,57 Cal. Rptr. 152, 158 (1967) (determining that probable cause exists where the
facts contained inthe affidavit would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believb, and contentiously

entertain, a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)
(stating that the test under federal law to determine the existence of probable cause is the totality of the

circumstances), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983).
10.
CAL PUn. UTI.. CODE § 588(b)(6) (enacted by Chapter 112); see id. (requiring the affidavit to
contain a statement of exigent circumstances, explaining why the investigator or inspector could not seek and
obtain a court order, search warrant, or other court process to gain production of the desired information); cf.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.314 (West 1990) (requiring law enforcement to submit a written statement

showing that the utility customer has committed a crime before allowing disclosure of utility records); State
v. Butterworth, 737 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Wash. App. 1987) (holding that police violated the Washington
Constitution by obtaining the defendant's address without authority of law), rev. denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1004
(1987). But see Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, No. 91-10-036, 1991 Cal. PUC LEXIS 691, at *5 (Oct. 23, 1991)
(prohibiting the Pacific Gas and Electric Company from releasing customer information to law enforcement
agencies except pursuant to legal process); but cf. People v. Lissauer, 169 Cal. App. 3d 413, 419, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 335, 338 (1985) (upholding the warrantless acquisition by police of a name and address from the
telephone company).
11.
CAL PUB. Ur1. CODE § 588(a) (enacted by Chapter 112).
12.
Id. § 588(b)(4) (enacted by Chapter 112).
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of the information to authorized persons. 3 However, a wilful violation of Chapter

112 is a misdemeanor punishable
by a fine of not less than $500, nor more than
4
$2000 for each offense.'
COMMENT

The provisions of Chapter 112 which allow law enforcement personnel to
obtain customer information from specified utilities may violate California's
constitutional privacy standards." Specifically, even though an investigator is

required to present an affidavit of probable cause to the utility when requesting
customer information, the lack of judicial involvement in the process may violate
6

the customer's privacy rights and constitute an unreasonable search and seizure.'

Under the California Constitution, an individual enjoys a right to privacy that
has been considered wider than that offered by federal law.'7 Accordingly,
California court decisions have placed restrictions on law enforcement's ability
to obtain personal information without a warrant or other judicial process in
circumstances
where federal decisions have held that no judicial involvement was
18
necessary.

In Burrows v. SuperiorCourt,9 the California Supreme Court enunciated the
rule that an unreasonable invasion of a person's constitutionally protected privacy

13.
Id § 588(c) (enacted by Chapter 112); cf CAL. WELi.& INST. CODE § 11478.5(c)(4) (West Supp.
1994) (declaring that a public utility shall not be subject to criminal or civil liability for the release of customer
information to the California Parent Locator Service).
14.
CAL. PUB. UT. CODE § 2112.5 (enacted by Chapter 112).
15.
See CAL. CONST. art. 1,§ I (providing that the right to privacy is inalienable); see also People v.
Chapman, 36 Cal. 3d 98, 108, 679 P.2d 62, 67,201 Cal. Rptr. 628, 633 (1984) (holding that a constitutionally
protected right to privacy exists in a person's unlisted name, address, and telephone number); White v. Davis,
13 Cal. 3d 757, 761, 533 P.2d 222, 225, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 97 (1975) (holding that the principal aim of
California's constitutional right to privacy provision is to limit the infringement upon personal privacy arising
from the government's collection and retention of personal data relating to all facets of a person's life).
16.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures); Burrows v. Superior
Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 244-45, 529 P.2d 590, 594-95, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 170-71 (1974) (holding that the
attainment of bank records by law enforcement officers without resort to judicial process was violative of
constitutional privacy principles and, thus, constituted an unreasonable search and seizure); see also Chapman,
36 Cal. 3d at 111, 679 P.2d at 70, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 636 (determining that police should resort to judicial
process to obtain private customer information held in the hands of a third party); People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d
640, 655, 602 P.2d 738, 747, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818, 827 (1979) (determining that credit card records obtaincd
through subpoena without judicial evaluation violated California constitutional requirements); Carlson v.
Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 3d 13, 22, 129 Cal. Rptr. 650, 655 (1976) (finding a constitutional violation in
police obtaining bank records via subpoena duces tecum).
17.
See Blair,25 Cal. 3d at 655, 602 P.2d at 747, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 827 (holding that a search may not
have been violative of federal principles, but was violative of California constitutional standards); see also
White, 13 Cal. 3d at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (observing that the right to privacy in
California is a fundamental and compelling interest).
18.
Blair, 25 Cal. 3d at 655-56, 602 P.2d at 747-48, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 827-28.
19.
13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166(1974).
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occurs where the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy" In the
public utilities context, it has been specifically held that such a reasonable
expectation of privacy existed in a person's unlisted telephone number, which is
obtainable through the procedures provided by Chapter 112.21 Indeed, other
personal information authorized to be released by Chapter 112 has also been
expressly found to be protected by the California constitutional cloak of privacy.'
In People v. Chapman,23 the court determined that an individual's disclosure
of his or her personal information to the telephone company did not serve to
reduce his or her reasonable expectation of privacy because he or she was

compelled to provide the information in order to obtain the service

4

This

principle is directly applicable to the utility services that will be required by
Chapter 112 to provide personal customer information which they possess in their
records and computer data bases'2 Since a customer's disclosure of this

information is not entirely voluntary in nature, under Chapman, it may be
protected from warrantless disclosure.26
The provision contained in Chapter 112 which requires the investigator or
inspector to provide the utility with a probable cause affidavit does not rescue

Chapter 112 from its potential unconstitutionality.27 In Burrows, the court evinced
a concern for peace officers having wide discretion to determine the scope and

20.
Burrows, 13 Cal. 3d at 242-43,529 P.2d at 592-93, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 168-69; accordKatz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-52 (1967) (determining that an individual possessed a constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy in a public telephone booth); see also People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 364,
486 P.2d 1262, 1267, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 67 (1971) (holding that the appropriate test to determine whether a
search and seizure occurred was whether the individual possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
items examined by law enforcement).
21.
People v. Chapman, 36 Cal. 3d 98,113,679 P.2d 62,71,201 Cal. Rptr 628, 637 (1984); see also
People v. McKunes, 51 Cal. App. 3d 487,490-91, 124 Cal. Rptr. 126, 128 (1975) (holding that a person's right
to privacy was violated when telephone company records of his outgoing calls were obtained without a
warrant). But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (determining that there was no federally
recognized right to privacy in telephone numbers dialed from an individual's home).
22.
See Chapman, 36 Cal. 3d at 108, 679 P.2d at 67, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 633 (holding that a person's
unlisted name and address were protected from warrantless disclosure); Burrows, 13 Cal. 3d at 247, 529 P.2d
at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172 (holding that an individual's name and address are protected in an effort to
prevent law enforcement from obtaining a warrantless "virtual current biography" of a person); see also Talley
v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (holding, in a First Amendment context, that there is a privacy interest
in one's name and address); cf. Schuster v. Municipal Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 887, 899, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447,
453 (1980) (determining that the forced disclosure of a person's name in campaign literature violated
constitutional principles), cert. denied sub. nom. California v. Schuster, 450 U.S. 1042 (1980).
23.
36 Cal. 3d 98,679 P.2d 62,201 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1984).
24.
Chapman, 36 Cal. 3d at 108, 679 P.2d at 67, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
25.
See CAL. PUa. UTIL, CODE § 588(a) (enacted by Chapter 112) (providing for the release of

information to the extent it exists inthe public utility's records and data bases).
26.
See Chapman,36 Cal. 3d at 108, 679 P.2d at 67,201 Cal. Rptr. at 633 (stating that the release of
personal information to obtain utility service did not decrease the customer's expectation of privacy because
the release was required in order to obtain service).

27.
See CAL PUB. UTL. CODE § 588(b)(6) (enacted by Chapter 112) (requiring the inspector or
investigator to complete a sworn affidavit of probable cause in order to obtain the customer information); see
also People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 655, 602 P.2d 738, 747, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818, 827 (1979) (holding that an
administrative subpoena did not meet the requirement that a judicial determination be involved in the
acquisition of personal information by law enforcement).
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relevancy of the information they sought.28 The concern of the Burrows court
would be realized through the use of Chapter 112 in that the individual
investigator would, in essence, be the final arbiter of whether probable cause
existed to obtain the customer information." This was precisely the result deemed
unacceptable by the Burrows court. 0
Once a court determines that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in certain information, the court will then decide whether the government's
warrantless acquisition of the information constitutes an unreasonable encroachment upon that person's privacy.3 ' The test of the reasonableness of governmental

encroachment upon a person's privacy is whether there is a compelling
governmental interest in obtaining the information?2 If no compelling
governmental interest exists, the encroachment is found unconstitutional?3
Chapter 112's purpose has been stated as the enhancement of district attorney
investigators' ability to acquire information regarding the location of an absent
parent or child.' This information, however, is already available to law
enforcement officials indirectly through the California Parent Locator Service,
which is authorized under existing law to receive this information from the
utilities.35 Although the acquisition of this information from the California Parent
Locator Service may take longer than is currently desirable, existing law
nonetheless provides this mechanism. 3 6 Thus, the governmental interest in the
health and welfare of children is currently being served, albeit not as efficiently
as desired.37 Therefore, use of Chapter 112's provisions may not be sufficiently
compelling, thus creating an unconstitutional encroachment upon a protected
privacy interest if its provisions are used.3"

28.
Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238,243,529 P.2d 590,593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169(1974).
29.
See CAL PUB. U rIL. CODE § 588(b)(1)-(6) (enacted by Chapter 112) (requiring the investigator to
state that the information is relevant to a missing or abducted child investigation; however, the affidavit is
submitted, without judicial review, directly to the utility).
30.
Burrows, 13 Cal. 3d at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169; see id. (stating a concern that
if warrantless acquisition of bank statements was found reasonable, a law enforcement officer could obtain
information of little relevance to an investigation, and such information could be introduced in a subsequent

criminal investigation).
31.
People v. Chapman, 36 Cal. 3d 98, 106, 679 P.2d 62, 66,201 Cal. Rptr. 628,632 (1984).

32.

White v.Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 761, 533 P.2d 222, 226, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 96 (1975); see id.

(holding that California's constitutional right to privacy laws did not prohibit such information gathering, but
required that the government have a compelling interest in doing so).
33.
Id.
34.
SENATEJUDICIARY COMMITFEE, CoNm=IIrg ANALysIs OF AB 2333, at 4 (Mar. 8, 1994).
35.
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 11478.5(a) (West Supp. 1994); see id. § 11478.5(c)(1) (West Supp,
1994) (listing the information obtainable by the California Parent Locator Service).
36.
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITEE, CommrnrrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 2333, at 4 (Mar. 8, 1994); see id.
(stating that it currently takes four to six weeks for investigators to obtain the information from the California
Parent Locator Service).
37.
Id.
38.
See White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 776, 533 P.2d 222, 234-35, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106-07 (1975)
(determining that, where there was no compelling governmental interest to justify impinging on a person's right
to privacy, the activity was unconstitutional).
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Other states have enacted measures similar to Chapter 112 .39 However, Chapter
112 appears to provide broader authorization than those other statutes.4 Although
the procedures outlined in Chapter 112 may violate California's constitutional
privacy standards, since they will not violate federal constitutional provisions, the
information developed through the use of Chapter 112 should not be suppressed
in any subsequent criminal proceeding against the party about whom the infor-

mation was obtained.4'

T Scott Belden

Public Entities, Officers, and Employees; state fingerprint identification
system

Penal Code § 13000 (new).
AB 3026 (Bowen); 1994 STAT. Ch. 875
Under existing law, the Department of Justice (Department)' is required to

maintain certain information regarding crime and law enforcement.2 Chapter 875

39.
See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-15.5-102 (West Supp. 1994) (providing for the release of customer
information by utilities to law enforcement; however, the circumstances must be life-threatening before release
may be made); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 200-B (1993) (restricting access to only the Attorney General's
Office, and only upon reasonable grounds that the utility is being used for an illegal purpose); N v. REV. STAT.
§ 425.400 (1993) (allowing for the release of public utilities information when needed by the Office of the
Attorney General, district attorneys, or others directly involved in investigations of child support matters); see
also Pagano v. Oroville Hosp., 145 F.R.D. 683. 698 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that the presence of restrictions
and safeguards may serve to decrease the likelihood that acquisition of personal information would be
considered unreasonable).
40.
CAL PUB. UTII- CODE § 588 (enacted by Chapter 112) (providing for neither judicial review of
affidavits prior to the submission of the request to the utility, nor requiring emergency circumstances before
warrantless disclosure may be made).
41.
See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 887, 694 P.2d 744, 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 639 (1985)
(determining that evidence obtained in violation of California constitutional search and seizure provisions was
admissible as long as federal constitutional standards were not violated); see also CAl. CONST. art. 1, § 28(d)
(stating that all relevant evidence will be admitted in criminal proceedings).

1.
See CAL GOV'TCODE § 15000 (West 1992) (creating the Department of Justice and placing it under
the direction and control of the Attorney General); id. § 15001 (West 1992) (providing that the Department
shall be composed of the Office of the Attorney General and the Division of Law Enforcement); id. § 15002.5
(West 1992) (authorizing the Attorney General to organize the work of the Department).
2.
CAL PENALCODE § 11105 (West Supp. 1994); see id. (requiring the Department to maintain a state
summary criminal history information); id. § 11 105(aX2) (West Supp. 1994) (defining state summary criminal
history information to include a person's identification and criminal history, name, date of birth, physical
description, fingerprints, and other data compiled by the Attorney General, but not by other criminal justice
agencies); see also id. §§ 11006-11144 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (providing the investigation, identification,
and information responsibilities of the Department); id. §§ 11100-11113 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (requiring
criminal information and statistics to be maintained by the Department); id. § 11101 (West Supp. 1994)

(requiring the Attorney General to keep information on criminals); id. § 11104 (West 1992) (requiring the
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requires the Department to maintain all statewide automated fingerprint systems.3
Chapter 875 exempts any state agency from its provisions if the automated
identification system needed to meet the agency's requirements is either less

costly than the system provided by the Department, or is not available through the
Department.' Chapter 875 also provides that the fingerprint identification systems
maintained5 by the Department will be accessible to various agencies when
necessary.
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT

The purpose of Chapter 875 is to establish an efficient fingerprint identification
system maintained solely by the Department of Justice. 6 Several state agencies are
currently required by law to maintain and collect fingerprint information! The
differences in the fingerprint collection format between these agencies can

frustrate exchange of information between the agencies.8 Creating a centralized

Attorney General to maintain a complete and systematic index of information); id. §§ 11112.1-11112.7 (West
1992) (regulating fingerprints); id. §§ 11140-11144 (West 1992) (prohibiting the unlawful furnishing of state
summary criminal history information to unauthorized persons); cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1005 (Michie
Supp. 1993) (requiring the Department of Arkansas State Police Identification Bureau to collect and maintain
fingerprint identification records); IDAHO CODE § 19-4803G) (Michie Supp. 1994) (requiring the superintendent
of the Idaho state police to collect and maintain information, including fingerprints, for the identification of
criminals); ME. Rsv. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1541 (West 1988) (providing that one of the duties of the
comnmanding officer of the State Bureau of Identification is to collect and maintain criminal history record
information, including fingerprints); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-74 (1987) (designating the Records Section as the

central location for a file system containing information, including fingerprints, on criminals, to be used by the
Secretary of Correction and Parole Commission).
3.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 13000(a) (enacted by Chapter 875); see id. (defining statewide automated
fingerprint system as an electronic comparison between fingerprints and a database of known persons).
4.
Id. § 13000(b) (enacted by Chapter 875).
5.
Id. § 13000(c) (enacted by Chapter 875); see id. § 13000(c)(1) (enacted by Chapter 875) (providing
that state agencies are authorized to access the fingerprint identification system pursuant to statutory
authorization to the extent permitted by federal law); id. § 13000(c)(2) (enacted by Chapter 875) (allowing
access to information pursuant to a court order or decision); id. § 13000(c)(3) (enacted by Chapter 875)
(allowing access to information pursuant to an inter-agency agreement with the Department to develop and
operate a system); see also id. § 13000(d) (enacted by Chapter 875) (allowing the Department to charge a fee
for access to its fingerprint identification system); cf id. § 11105(b) (West Supp. 1994) (mandating that the
Attorney General provide state summary criminal history information to specified persons and agencies if it
is needed in the course of the person's or agency's duties); id. § 11105(c) (Vest Supp. 1994) (providing that
the Attorney General may provide criminal information to specified persons and agencies upon a showing of
compelling need). See generally55 CAL. JR. 3D Recordsand Recording Laws §§ 14-19 (3d ed. 1980 & Supp.

1994) (discussing offenses involving public records).
6.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR, CoMMrTTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3026, at 1 (May 26, 1994).
7.
ASSEMBLYCOMMnTEEoN PuBLIcSAFETY, COMMrrEEANALYSiS OFAB 3026, at I (Apr. 5, 1994);
see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.37(c) (West Supp. 1994) (requiring every applicant for a permit to conduct

a check cashier's business to pay a fee for the cost of processing, fingerprinting, and checking the applicant
for a criminal record); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105(a) (West Supp. 1994) (requiring the Department to maintain
criminal records, including fingerprints); CAL. VEH. CODE § 12800(c) (Vest Supp. 1994) (requiring every
application for an original or renewed driver's license to contain fingerprint identification).
8.

ASSEMBLYCOM ,IMTEON PtBUCSAFETY, COMMrEANALYSIS OFAB 3026, at 2 (Apr. 5, 1994);

see id. (explaining that the Department of Motor Vehicles collects thumbprints, law enforcement agencies
collect fingerprints of all ten digits, and other agencies collect fingerprints from only the index finger).
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system that can be accessed by all agencies will circumvent this problem? In
addition, the substantial costs of purchasing and maintaining different fingerprint
identification systems can be avoided by a more efficient single system.'0
Despite the benefit of a single information system, the same problem that
makes exchange of information between agencies difficult may make
centralization of information just as difficult." As different agencies use different
formats for storing fingerprints, such as digitally or manually stored prints,
transferring this information to the Department's system may involve refingerprinting individuals and purchasing new equipment.' In addition, a
centralized system may not be tailored to the needs of the individual agencies.13
Finally, the cost of implementing the new system has been calculated to exceed
$150,000 due to the need for additional hardware, software, space, and personnel
required to transfer
and translate existing systems and fingerprints to the
4
Department.
An additional potential problem is caused by the great amount of information5
that must be contained in the system to meet the needs of the agencies it serves.
This information may be inadvertently
distributed to unauthorized persons,
6
precautions.'
security
despite
Maria V Daquipa

9.
Id.; see id. (noting the substantial costs of purchasing and maintaining separate identification
systems, and suggesting that the Department is the best location for a single fingerprint information system that
different state agencies can access); see also Ronald J. Ostrow, Technology May Aid Busy Border Patrol,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Jun. 3, 1994, at B5 (reporting on a new fingerprint identification system being used to
identify undocumented immigrants and retrieve their criminal records); Margot Slade, Computer Closing in
on Crooks: FingerprintRegistry Links Police Nationwide, DAILY NEWs OF Los ANGELES, Nov. 14, 1993, at

U2 (reporting on the use of the new technology of automated fingerprint identification systems, which can
match fingerprints taken at a crime scene with thousands of fingerprints on file within hours).
10.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR, CoMtMr
ANALYSIS oFAB 3026, at 1 (May 26, 1994).
11.

ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3206, at 3 (Apr. 12,

1994); see id. (noting the problems involved in implementing a centralized system, such as the absence of a
standardized method of storing fingerprint information, the costs involved in transferring this information to
the Department, and the need to address the different needs of each state agency that currently maintains its
own identification system).
12.
Id. at 2; see id. (commenting on current fingerprint information storage practices).
13.
Id. at 4; see also id. at 2 (noting that the automated finger image matching system being used by
the Los Angeles County Department of Social Services is used for matching purposes only, and not as a
positive identification system).
14.
ASSEMBLY COMMITFEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, COMMInE ANALYSIS OF AB 3026, at 1 (May 11,
1994).
15.

ASSENMBLY COMNMiTrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COmmITFEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3026, at 4 (Apr. 12,

1994).
16.
Id. at 4; cf CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11140-11144 (West 1992) (regulating the unlawful furnishing of
state summary criminal history information to unauthorized persons); 55 CAL. JUR. 3D Records and Recording
Laws §§ 14-19 (3d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1994) (discussing offenses involving public records). See generallyJohn
Shattuck, Commentary: In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification Systems, Computer-Matching,and
Privacy in the United States, 35 HASTINGS LJ. 991 (1984) (commenting on the implications of certain
technological developments on one's privacy); id. at 993-94 (noting the possibility of a breach in computer
security by computer hackers).
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competition in local markets
Public Utilities Code § 709 (amended).
SB 1966 (Calderon); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1284
Public Utilities Code § 709.5 (new).
AB 3606 (Moore); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1260
Existing law gives the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) t broad
authority to regulate public utilities. This includes the authority to regulate all
telephone services," but not cable television services.4
Chapter 1284 adds to existing law by making a legislative finding that the
telecommunications industry would benefit from increased competition.5 Chapter
1260 provides that the Legislature intends that all telecommunication markets
under the regulation of the CPUC be opened to competition by January 1, 1997,

1.
See CAL CoNsr. art. XII, § 22 (creating the CPUC); CAL PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 301-320 (Wcst 1975
& Supp. 1994) (setting forth the organization of the CPUC).
2.
CAL. PUB. UTIL CODE § 701 (West 1975); see i.L§ 216 (West Supp. 1994) (defining public utility);
Application of Silver Beehive Tel. Co. Inc., 71 Cal. P.U.C., 304, 307 (1970) (stating that the Commission has
jurisdiction over intrastate public utility operations); see also California Community Television Ass'n v.
General Tel. Co., 73 Cal. P.U.C., 507, 517 (1972) (holding that cable television companies are not public
utilities and are not regulated by the CPUC); Paul M. Hogan, Comment, Utilities, the State, and the Public
Interest,9 HASTINGS LJ. 176, 178-80 (1958) (discussing the criteria for a public utility). See generally Eddy
S. Feldman, A Symposium on Public Utilities Regulation in California, 30 S. CAL L. REV. 115 (1957)
(discussing public utilities regulation and the authority of the CPUC).
3.

See CAL. PuB. UTIL CODE § 234 (West Supp. 1994) (defining telephone corporation); see also

Television Transmission, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 47 Cal. 2d 82, 86, 301 P.2d 862, 864 (1956) (stating
that in order for a corporation to be a telephone corporation it must operate a telephone line).
4.
California Community Television Ass'n, 73 Cal. P.U.C., at 517; see 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-559 (West
1991 & Supp. 1994) (setting forth federal regulations for cable television); id. § 556(c) (West 1991) (stating
that inconsistent state law regulating cable television is preempted by federal law); In re Generic Investigation
Into Cable Television Serv., 707 P.2d 1155, 1161-63 (N.M. 1985) (holding that federal law does not preempt
state regulation of intrastate cable data transmission and stating guidelines for when federal law will preempt
state law); SENATE COMMrTEE ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES, CommiTTm
EE ANALYSIS OF AB 3606, at I
(June 28, 1994) (stating that the CPUC does not regulate cable services); Telephone Interview with Randy
Chinn, Consultant for Assemblymember Moore on AB 3606, in Sacramento, Cal. (July 5, 1994) (notes on file
with the PacificLaw Journal) [hereinafter Interview with Consultantfor AB 3606] (stating that the CPUC does
not regulate cable services as they are regulated by federal law); see also 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 152(a) (West
1991) (giving the federal government authority to regulate interstate and foreign communication); id. § 152(b)
(West 1991) (giving states the authority to regulate intrastate communication); id. § 221(b) (West 1991) (giving
states jurisdiction over consolidated or merged telephone companies). See generally Richard M. Synchef,
Municipal Ownership of Cable Television Systems, 12 U.S.F. L. REV., 205, 213-29 (1978) (discussing federal
cable television regulations); Jonathan Galst, Note, "Phony" Intent?: An Examination of Regulatory.
Preemption Jurisprudence,67 N.Y.U. L REV. 108, 108-23 (1992) (discussing federal preemption and the dual
regulatory scheme of federal and state governments regarding telecommunications).
5.
CAL PUB. UT. CODE § 709(d)-(e) (amended by Chapter 1284); see AsSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMII-rEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 3606, at 2 (May 17, 1994) (discussing the need for increased competition in
telecommunication markets).
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and provides the CPUC with the authority to promulgate additional rules and

regulations to achieve fair competition.6
Additionally, Chapter 1260 provides that by filing for approval of a certificate
of public convenience and necessity,7 any cable television corporation8 or its

affiliates may enter the market if any local exchange telephone company' gains
the right to offer cable television or video dialtone.' ° Chapter 1260 also provides
that a cable television corporation that is granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity may be held to similar standards as the existing local

exchange telephone company."
INTERPRETriVE COMMENT
Chapter 1260 was enacted to foster competition in local telephone markets' 2
This may have been in response to the federal government encouraging

6.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 709.5(a)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 1260).
7.
See CAL Pun. UTIL. CODE §§ 1001-1011 (West 1994) (setting forth the requirements for a
certificate of public convenience and necessity for specified utilities); see also Application of Palm Springs
Outpost Water Co., 53 Cal. P.U.C., 717, 719 (1954) (stating that a key element for being granted a certificate
of public convenience and necessity is a showing that the applicant is willing and able to perform the proposed
operations); Application ofErest Tyhurst, 47 Cal. P.U.C., 667, 673-74 (1948) (holding that the elements to
consider for the granting of a certificate of public convenience and necessity include whether the service is
needed, whether the applicant can perform the service, the quantity and quality of existing service, and the
possible effect of multiple facilities).
8.
See CAL. PuB. UT. CODE § 215.5 (West 1975) (defining cable television corporations as any
corporation that transmits television programs via cable for a fee).

9.
See id. § 2894(b)(2) (West 1994) (defining local exchange corporations as telephone corporations
that provide local exchange services); cf id. §2894(b)(1) (West 1994) (defining inter-exchange corporations
as telephone corporations that are long distance carriers).
10.
Id. § 709.5(d) (enacted by Chapter 1260); see ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COmmrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB
3606, at 2 (May 17, 1994) (stating that video dialtone is a new cable service that both the telephone and cable
industries are trying to control); SENATE COsMMEE ON ENERGY AND PUBUiC UTILITIES, COMMrTEE ANALYSIS
OF AB 3606, at 1 (June 28, 1994) (describing video dialtone as a service whereby a telephone company

provides a gateway for video services); see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54-.58 (1993) (setting forth federal regulations
for telephone corporations regarding video dialtone); 57 Fed. Reg. 41106, at 41106-07 (1992) (to be codified
at 47 C.F.R. § 63) (discussing the findings of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding video
dialtone for telephone corporations); Fred Dawson, Cable Seeking Help in Battle with PacBell, MULTICHANNEL

NEws, Feb. 21, 1994, at 53, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (discussing the cable industry's
response to Pacific Bell's pending FCC application including the support of Assembly Bill 3606); Pacific Bell
Begins Building Video Network, United Communications Group, No. 105 (May 31, 1994) availablein LEXIS,

News Library, Cumws File (stating that Pacific Bell has an application pending before the FCC for a video
dialtone network in California). See generally Angela J. Campbell, Publish or Carriage:Approaches to
Analyzing the FirstAmendment Rights of Telephone Companies, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1075-85 (1992)

(discussing video dialtone regulation and its history).
11.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 709.5(e) (enacted by Chapter 1260); see id. (stating that if the local
exchange corporation is subject to CPUC standards regarding interconnection of networks, network
unbundling, or service quality, then the cable television corporation or its affiliates may also be subject to such
standards).
12.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3606, at 2 (May 17, 1994); Interview with
Consultantfor AB 3606, supra note 4; see Donald Woutat, Reaching Out; PacBell Enlists Legislature in
Lobbyingfor Long-Distance,LA. TiMEs, June 19, 1994, at D3 (discussing the opening of telecommunications
competition in Califomi4 and focusing on Pacific Bell's position in support of an open market).
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competition in the telecommunications market.'3 However, many complex issues
arise when opening telecommunications competition, including providing for fair
competition, maintaining compatibility amongst competitors, and providing
universal service in a competitive market.1 4
JonathanP. Hobbs
Public Entities, Officers and Employees; telecommunication corporationscompetition in long distance markets
Public Utilities Code § 709.2 (new).

AB 3720 (Costa); 1994 STAT. Ch. 934
Under existing federal case law, Pacific Bell' is prohibited from providing long
distance telephone service.2 Chapter 934 requires the California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC) 3 to authorize fully open competition in the intrastate interLATA4 telecommunications market if federal law changes to permit such

13.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMM=ITEE ANALYsts OF AB 3606, at 2 (May 17, 1994); see 57 Fed. Reg.
41106, at 41106 (1992) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 63) (stating the FCC's finding that consumers would
benefit by increased competition in the video industry); William J.Eaton & Leslie Helm, House Rewrites

Phone, Cable Rules, L.A. TIMEs, June 29, 1994, at Al (discussing federal endeavors toward deregulation of
the telecommunications industry); Letter from Dennis H. Mangers, Senior Vice President, California Cable
Television Ass'n, to Gwen Moore, Member, California State Assembly (Mar. 23, 1994) (copy on file with the
Pacific Law Journal) (supporting AB 3606 and stating that the federal government is opening the
telecommunications market to competition).
14.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITfEE ANALYSIS oFAB 3606, at2 (May 17, 1994).

1.
See SENATEOFICEOFRESEARCH, CHANGES INOURTELEPHONEREGULATION: COMPEI7MONATTHE
CROSSROADS, at 3 (1989) (stating that Pacific Bell is one of the seven regional Bell Operating Companies

created after the divestiture of AT&T and is a regulated utility subsidiary of Pacific Telesis).
2.
United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 552 F. Supp. 131, 188-89 (D.D.C. 1982), affd
mera. sub nora. Maryland v. United States, 461 U.S. 1001 (1983); see id. (approving, in the original divestiture
judgment, the portion of the consent decree that prohibited Bell Operating Companies from competing in the

inter-LATA market); see also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 907 F.2d 160, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting
that the divestiture judgment's restriction on the Bell Operating Companies' inter-LATA service is still extant).
3.
See CAL CONST. art. XII, § 1 (establishing the California Public Utilities Commission as five
members appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate); id. § 2 (providing the CPUC with the power
to establish procedures subject to statute and due process); id. § 3 (placing, inter alia, corporations that operate
telephone systems under the control of the Legislature); CAL PUB. UTL.. CODE § 701 (West 1975) (providing
the CPUC the authority to do all things, including, but not limited to, things specifically authorized by the
Legislature, as necessary and convenient to supervise and regulate public utilities); id. § 702 (West 1975)
(requiring public utilities to comply with orders of the CPUC).
4.
See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 993 n.4 (D.D.C. 1982) (explaining that
LATA stands for Local Access and Transport Area); id. at 993-94 (defining LATA as a territory generally

centering upon a city or other identifiable community of interest); id. at 994 (pointing out that a LATA marks
the boundary beyond which a Bell Operating Company may not carry telephone calls). The term "exchange
area" was used in the divestiture judgment instead of "LATA," but "LATA" is preferred to avoid confusion
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competition 5 If such change is not forthcoming by October 1, 1995, then the
CPUC is required to order Pacific Bell to seek permission to compete from the
federal district court overseeing the judgment under which Pacific Bell is
presently prohibited from competing Chapter 934 further requires that before
open competition be permitted, the CPUC must determine that: (1) There is open

access to the telephone exchange facilities controlled by Pacific Bell;7 (2) Pacific
Bell is not unfairly competing for inter-LATA customers by using its customer

information generated by virtue of Pacific Bell's position as local exchange
carrier; (3) Pacific Bell can be effectively prevented by the CPUC from cross-

subsidizing its inter-LATA business by overcharging for intra-LATA services;8

and (4) there is no substantial possibility of harm to the competitive intrastate

inter-LATA market.' Chapter 934 also provides that none of these provisions will

the
constitute a state action because a finding of state action could immunize
0
actions that Pacific Bell takes from liability under the Sherman Act.

with the much smaller local exchange area. Id.at 993-94 n.9. See also SENATE OmCE OFRESEARCH, CHANGES
INOUR TELEPHONE REGULATION: COMPErrrON AT THE CROSSROADS, at 8 (1989) (showing a map of the

California LATAs which are labeled: (1) San Francisco; (2) Chico; (3) Sacramento; (4) Fresno; (5) Los
Angeles; (6) San Diego; (7)Bakersfield; (8) Monterey; (9) Stockton; and (10) San Luis Obispo); cf.United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 907 F.2d 160, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting the existence of the term LATA, but
preferring to use inter-exchange).
CAL.PUB. UTi1.CODE § 709.2(a) (enacted by Chapter 934); see Erin M. Reilly, Comment, The
5.
Telecommunications Industry in 1993: The Year of the Merger, 2 COMM. LAw CONSPECTUS 95, 102 n.78
(1994) (noting that, in 1993, five of the Bell Operating Companies collectively petitioned the FCC to adopt
rules facilitating their reentry into the inter-LATA market); see also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900
F.2d 283, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (affirming the district court's denial of permission to the Bell Operating
Companies to enter into the inter-LATA market partly because the FCC had not promulgated rules necessary
to regulate the companies in the inter-LATA market).
6.

CAL PUB. UT.. CODE § 709.2(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 934); see id. § 709.2(b)(2) (enacted by

Chapter 934) (rescinding the order if all legal recourse is exhausted without obtaining a change in the law).
See Re Open Access to Bottleneck Services and Framework for Network Architecture, Development
7.
of Dominant Carrier Networks, R.93-04-003, 1.93-04-002, 141 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PER) 519, slip op. at 2
(1993) (requiring the largest California local exchange carriers, i.e., Pacific Bell, GTEC, Contel, Citizens,
Utilities, and Roseville, to offer open, nondiscriminatory access to their networks).
See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (explaining that cross8.
subsidization is anticompetitive when used to set prices below cost in the competitive market and thereby
acquire power, and suggesting that a Bell Operating Company could use cost misallocation to pass inflated
costs on to local ratepayers in the regulated monopoly market).
CAL PUB. UTIL. CODE §709.2(c)(1)-(4) (enacted by Chapter 934); see id. §709.2(d) (enacted by
9.
Chapter 934) (permitting the opening of the intrastate inter-LATA market as early as the opening of
competition within the local exchange markets).
CAL PUB.UM. CODE § 709.2(e) (enacted by Chapter 934); see id.§709.2(0 (enacted by Chapter
10.
934) (declaring that no part of Chapter 934 is to be construed as preempting the unfair practices or antitrust
law of California); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1979)
(ruling that immunity requires that the action alleged to be in restraint of trade be both a clearly articulated state
policy and actively supervised by the state); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,350-51 (1942) (holding that the
Sherman Act does not apply to activities of astate or its officers or agents directed by the state's legislature);
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrrrEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSTS OF AB 3720, at 2 (June 28, 1994) (stating that the

provisions in AB 3720 with respect to state action were added to allay fears that Pacific Bell would receive an
exemption from antitrust law). But see Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471
U.S. 48, 62 (1984) (finding aParkerimmunity even though the challenged action taken by private parties was

not compelled by the State); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 569 (1983) (permitting a finding of antitrust

immunity without requiring findings of a "clear articulation" and "active supervision" where the challenged
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Telecommunications were largely under the control of a single corporation,
American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T), until the divestiture from AT&T
of its local exchange carriers." The divestiture occurred because AT&T had the
power, by virtue of its control of the local exchanges, to prevent competition in

the long distance market by carriers who proposed to set up long distance
connections via microwave transmissions.' 2 These divested carriers, the regional
Bell Operating Companies, were given monopolies over local exchange service
because this was believed to be a natural monopoly. 3
This belief is challenged today, however, and local exchange service is being

opened to competition.' 4 Because this diminishes the capacity of the Bell
Operating Companies to engage in anticompetitive behavior, these companies

urge that they be permitted to compete in the intrastate inter-LATA market."5 The
District Court for the District of Columbia, which oversees enforcement of the
divestiture judgment, has prevented this type of competition except in extremely
limited circumstances.' 6 That court's position may be changed, however, by
consideration of the loss of monopoly power by the Bell Operating Companies
anticompetitive conduct is in fact that of the state legislature).
11.
See ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFER THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELECOMiMiNICATIONS IN A MORE
CoMwEmrVE ERA 8 (1991) (stating that prior to its divestiture, AT&T provided service to roughly 80% of the
nation's telephone subscribers). The Bell Operating Companies continue to provide service to 80% of the
market. Id. at 9.
12.
See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 162 (D.D.C. 1982) (asserting that AT&T was able
to deter competition by manipulating prices for access to the Operating Company networks); see also MCI
Communications Corp. v. AT&T. 708 F.2d 1081, 1094 (7th Cir. 1983) (describing MCI's proposed longdistance system as terminals in Chicago and St. Louis connected by microwave radio relay towers); United
States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 195 (D.D.C. 1982) (relating that one of the government's principal
contentions was that interconnections that AT&T provided to competitors were inferior in quality to those
provided to AT&T's Long Lines Department).
13.
See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 187 (noting that the Operating Companies possess a
monopoly in local telecommunications); E. THoMAs SULLIVAN & HEnERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW,
POLICY AND PROCEDURE 940 (3d ed. 1994) (defining natural monopoly as a market that can be served most
efficiently by a single incumbent firm).
14.
See Re Open Access to Bottleneck Services and Framework for Network Architecture, Development
of Dominant Carrier Networks, R.93-04-003, 1.93-04-002, 141 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PER) 519, slip op. at 2
(1993) (opening access to local exchange facilities to all service providers on a nondiscriminatory basis); Local
Telephone Competition: HigherResidentialRates for Lower Business Rates?, JointInformational Hearing
of the Assembly Utilitiesand Commerce Committee and Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities,at
1 (Oct. 17, 1991) (noting with surprise that neither Pacific Bell nor GTE oppose the CPUC's proposal to break
up their monopoly on telephone service within their areas).
15.
1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 934, sec. 2, at 4598-4599; see SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS
OFAB 3720, at 2 (Aug. 22, 1994) (claiming that Chapter 934 makes the legislative finding that long-distance
providers will have a competitive advantage over Pacific Bell if local competition is authorized and Pacific Bell
is not permitted into the inter-LATA market).
16.
See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1261, at *7-*8 (D.D.C. 1992)
(permitting the Bell Operating Companies to participate in inter-LATA transport with regard to "800 service"
databases but requiring the Bell Operating Companies to use the inter-exchange facilities of an inter-exchange

carrier to provide the service); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5250, at *6-*7,
(D.D.C. 1989) (holding that Pacific Telesis could enter the market for telecommunications between Japan and
the United States since that market does not affect the domestic inter-exchange market).
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and the continued dominance of the inter-LATA market by AT&T.17 It also may
be changed by Congressional Act."8
Even if federal law does change, Pacific Bell will still need to establish for the
CPUC that it will not engage in anticompetitive behavior.9 Subsequent approval
by the CPUC is likely because the criteria that the CPUC will use is similar to
that which the District Judge would use in permitting competition and also
because the CPUC has committed itself to the promotion of competition in the

telecommunications market in preference to regulationO
Owen W. Dukelow

Public Entities, Officers, and Employees; telecommuting-mandatory plans
in state agencies

Government Code § 14200.1 (new); § 14201 (amended).
AB 2672 (Cortese); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1209
Under prior law, state agencies' were authorized to include telecommutinj into

their transportation programs.' Chapter 1209 requires all state agencies to develop
and implement programs incorporating telecommuting into their transportation
procedures before July 1, 1995. Additionally, Chapter 1209 provides that

17.
See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 195 (permitting removal of a restriction on a showing
that there is no possibility that an Operating Company could use its monopoly power to impede competition
in the market); Glen 0. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing World of
Telecommunications: Telecommunicationsin Turmoil: Technology andPublic Policy, 5 YALE J.ON REG. 517,
539 (1990) (book review) (pointing out that AT&T's 80% to 85% share of the inter-LATA market suggests
competition that is less than optimally robust).
18.
See S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (authorizing Bell Operating Companies to engage in the
provision of inter-LATA services); H.R. 3626, 103rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) (permitting Bell Operating
Companies to apply to the FCC for authorization to provide inter-exchange telecommunications).
19.
CAL PuB. UTmL CODE § 709.2(c) (enacted by Chapter 934).
See Re Open Access to Bottleneck Services and Framework for Network Architectu(e, Development
20.
of Dominant Carrier Networks, R.93-04-003,1.93-04-002, 141 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PER) 519, slip op at 10
(1993) (affirming the CPUC's primary reliance on market forces as the vehicle for promoting development of
an advanced telecommunications infrastructure). Compare CAL PUB. UTIL. CODE § 709.2(c) (enacted by
Chapter 934) (listing the types of anticompetitive activities the CPUC is required to insure against) with United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 290-91 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (approving the lower court's two part
inquiry of. (I) Whether the Bell Operating Company would actually have the incentive and opportunity to act
anticompetitively; and (2) whether the participation of the Bell Operating Company would contribute to the
creation of a competitive market).

1.

See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11000 (West 1992) (defining state agency).

See id. § 14200 (West 1992) (defining telecommuting as the substitution of computers and
2.
telecommunications technology for commuting by employees residing in the state).
3.
1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1389, sec. I, at 5440 (enacting CAL. GOV'TCODE § 14201).
4.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 14201 (amended by Chapter 1209).
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agencies that had previously initiated telecommuting programs may continue
them in accordance with the policies of the Department of General Services.5
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT

The purpose of Chapter 1209 is to promote telecommuting by state employees

in an effort to reduce pollution6 and increase employee productivity.7 The need
to mandate these programs stemmed from the apparent reluctance of some state
agencies to develop telecommuting programs, which, under prior law, were

optional

Several reasons have been cited for this reluctance, including

bureaucratic inertia,9 the recession," and a disbelief by managers that the

telecommuters are actually working while at home."
Telecommuting is a growing phenomenon and the benefits are beginning to be
discovered by both government and private entities.12 Currently, several private
companies are establishing programs to allow their workers to telecommute. 3

Also, numerous government entities are instituting programs to encourage
telecommuting by their employees and by private sector workers.'4

5.
Id.
6.
See id. § 14200.1(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 1209) (declaring that telecommuting can be an
important means of reducing air pollution).
Id § 14200.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 1209); see id. § 14200.1(a)(2) (stating that employee
7.
productivity will be stimulated through the flexibility offered by telecommuting).
8.
SENATEF.oORCoMMrEE, COMMTEANALYSIS OFAB 2672, at I (May 16, 1994);see 1990Cal.
Legis Serv. ch. 1389, sec. 1, at 5440 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 14201) (attempting to encourage
telecommuting through an optional program); see also Here's Looking at Them, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 14,
1994. at F1 (describing the resistance by most state agency managers toward implementing telecommuting
programs).
See Here's Looking at Them, supra note 8 (describing how state bureaucracies would rather
9.
continue building office buildings than promote telecommuting).
See id. (relating that the recession had placed severe constraints on the government's ability to
10.
develop telecommuting programs).
11.
See Alice Bredin, The Number of Americans Working Out of Their Homes is Growing at a
Phenomenal Rate, NEWSDAY, Sept. 13, 1993, at 31 (discussing widespread managerial reluctance toward
telecommuting).
12.
A Not So Gentle Push Into the Telecommuting World: Businesses See Work at Home Increasing,
PC WK., Jan. 24, 1994, at 1; see id. (stating that nationwide 2.8 million people telecommuted full-time at the
end of 1993).
Here's Looking at Them, supra note 8; see id. (describing recent telecommuting initiatives by
13.
Pacific Bell, Hewlett-Packard, and other private companies).
Government Takes Leadin Promoting Telecommuting, TEaco Bus. REP., Dec. 20, 1993, at No. 41.
14.
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Given the large number of state employees located in some of California's
most polluted cities,"5 the implementation of effective telecommuting programs
by state agencies should serve to reduce overall pollution levels and ease life for
telecommuting workers.' 6
T Scott Belden

Public Entities, Officers and Employees; telephone corporationsmandatory 911 emergency service to all households
Public Utilities Code § 2883 (new).
SB 1630 (Hart); 1994 STAT. Ch. 612
Under existing law, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)' has
the authority to regulate services by telephone corporations.' Chapter 612 requires
telephone corporations to provide access to 911 emergency service for all
residential households with existing and newly installed telephone connections,
regardless of whether an account has been established for the end user. Chapter

612 prohibits telephone corporations from terminating access to these services for
nonpayment of any delinquent account or indebtedness owed by the subscriber
to the telephone corporation. 4

15.
See, e.g., Here's Looking at Them, supranote 8 (stating that nearly 70,000 state employees work
in the Sacramento area and less than 5% telecommute).

16.

Bredin, supranote 11; see id. (discussing the ameliorating effect telecommuting has on pollution

and employee expenses).

1.
See CAL PUB. UTL CODE §§ 701-882 (West 1975 & Supp. 1994) (setting provisions for the CPUC
to regulate public utilities under the Public Utilities Act).
2.
Id. § 216 (West Supp. 1994); see id. § 216(a) (West Supp. 1994) (defining public utility to include
a telegraph or telephone corporation where the service is performed for the public); id. § 216(b) (West Supp.
1994) (noting that such service is subject to the Public Utilities Act).
3.
Id. § 2883(a) (enacted by Chapter 612); see id. (exempting wireless and cellular telephone
corporations from this provision); see also SENATE COMMnTEE ON ENERGY AND PUBUC UTIniEs, COMIrrE
ANALYSIS oFSB 1630, at 2 (Apr. 19, 1994) (noting that since dial tone service can be provided only through
local telephone companies, the statute is applicable only to local telephone corporations).
4.
CAL. PUB. UTIL CODE § 2883(b) (enacted by Chapter 612); see id. (providing that a violation of
Chapter 612 is a misdemeanor); cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 364.3375(2)(a) (West Supp. 1994) (requiring each pay
telephone station to receive and provide coin-free access to the 911 emergency number or a local operator);
IDAHO CODE § 31-4811 (Supp. 1994) (requiring providers of pay phones to convert stations to allow dialing
911 or the telephone company operator without the deposit of a coin or other charge to the caller); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 403.04(2) (West Supp. 1994) (mandating public utilities to permit dialing of the 911 number at pay
phones without coin or other charge to the caller); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.70(2)(g) (West 1989) (requiring each
pay phone to enable a user to reach 911 without inserting a coin). See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53112
(West 1983) (requiring all pay phones to enable a caller to dial 911 for emergency services, and to reach an
operator by dialing 0).
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Although approximately ninety-five percent of California residents currently
have a telephone, some consumers do not have access to 911 emergency services
because they have not established an account or have had service disconnected

because of nonpayment of their telephone billV Chapter 612 requires local
telephone corporations to establish warm line services to all telephone users to
ensure access to 911 emergency services.6 Chapter 612 is applicable only to
existing or newly installed residential households and does not impose a mandate
on telephone corporations to install telephone service for households without
necessary wiring.7
Todd Eberle

5.
SENATE CO iMrIrT ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES, CoMMIrrrE ANALYSIS OF SB 1630, at I
(Apr. 19, 1994); see id. at 2 (noting claims by Consumer Action reflecting that tragedies have occurred because

of a lack of available emergency 911 service).
6.
CAL PUB. UTI. CODE § 2883(a) (enacted by Chapter 612); see id. § 2883(c) (enacted by Chapter
612) (requiring telephone corporations to inform customers of the availability of warm line service); see also
SENATE COMIMTEE ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILrTS, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1630, at 1 (Apr. 19,
1994) (declaring the Legislature's intent to provide low-income consumers who cannot afford basic telephone
service with access to emergency telephone service). But see id. at 2 (noting amendments suggested by Pacific
Bell that eliminated warm line access to 800 numbers due to the possibility of fraud). See generally id. (noting
that 0-operator and 611 services accessible through a warm line as originally provided by SB 1630 were
eliminated by subsequent amendments).
7.
CAL PUB. UTI. CODE § 2883(a) (enacted by Chapter 612); see id. § 2883(d) (enacted by Chapter
612) (stating that this statute does not relieve any person of an obligation to pay a debt owed to a telephone
corporation); see also SENATE COMMIT=E ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTLrms, COMrInrE ANALYSIS OF SB
1630, at 1 (Apr. 19, 1994) (declaring the Legislature's intent to not require telephone companies to provide
wiring to households which do not have current telephone service capability). See generally Letter from
Stephen C. Matheny, Regional Administrator-Regulatory Affairs, GTE Telephone Operations, Sacramento,
California, at 1 (Mar. 9, 1994) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal)(noting that Express Dial Tone,
GTEC's warm line equivalent, was available in approximately 72% of GTEC territories in early 1994 and
expected to be 93% by the end of 1994, and 98% by 1995).
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